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A Judge's Failure To Recuse Himself From A Case
In Which One Of The Parties Donated A
Substantial Amount of Money To His Political
Campaign Violates The Due Process Clause.
Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-JUDGES-IMPARTIALITY-
The United States Supreme Court held that a judge's failure to
recuse himself from a case in which an interested party had do-
nated a substantial amount of money to the judge's political cam-
paign violated the Due Process Clause because of the innate prob-
ability of bias.
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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I. THE FACTS ANJD PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CAPERTON
Hugh Caperton, Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining
Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales ("Caperton") sued A.T. Massey
Coal Co. and its affiliates ('Massey") in Boone County, West Vir-
ginia.' The heart of Caperton's claim was that Massey had tor-
tiously ruined Caperton's businesses. 2 Massey was found "liable
for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious inter-
ference with existing contractual relations" for its actions against
Caperton.3 The jury returned a $50 million verdict in favor of Ca-
perton.4
After the trial court rendered its judgment, but prior to Mas-
sey's appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
judicial elections were held in West Virginia.5
Don Blankenship, chairman and high-ranking officer in the
Massey Corporation, was aware that the Supreme Court of West
Virginia would hear the appeal in the case. 6 Blankenship decided
to support Brent Benjamin, the attorney running against the in-
cumbent Justice Warren McGraw, for a position on Supreme
Court of West Virginia. 7 To support Benjamin, Blankenship do-
nated $1,000 to his campaign committee, 8 and also donated ap-
proximately $2.5 million to a political organization that supported
Benjamin. 9 In addition to these contributions. Blankenship spent
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. ct. 2252, 2256 (2009).
2. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
3. Id. The trial court found that Massey "intentionally acted in utter disregard of
[Caperton's] rights and ultimately destroyed [Caperton's] businesses because, after con-




6. Id. Blanikenship was Massey's chairman, chief executive officer, and president. Id.
7. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
8. Id. The West Virginia Code of State Rules limits contributions to political cam-
paigns to $1,000. W. VA. CODE R. § 146-3-5.2 (2008).
9. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. Blankenship donated the money to a political organi-
zation called "And For The Sake Of The Kids," which was formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527
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$500,000 on various advertising methods in order to support Ben-
jamin.' 0 The money contributed by Blankenship far exceeded any
other Benjamin supporter or contributor.'" In the election, Ben-
jamin defeated incumbent Justice McGraw by more than 47,000
votes. 12
Before Massey filed the petition for appeal to the Supreme
Court of West Virginia, Caperton tried to have Justice Benjamin
removed from hearing the case. 13 Justice Benjamin found no rea-
son to remove himself from hearing the case, however, and denied
the motion.'14 The Supreme Court of West Virginia granted review
of Massey's petition challenging the $50 million verdict entered by
the trial court.' 5 In the West Virginia Supreme Court decision,
the majority agreed that Massey's prior actions favored a judg-
ment against them, but they overturned the trial court on other
grounds.' 6 The two dissenting justices authored separate opinions
in which they expressed deep concerns with the majority's hold-
ing.17
After Caperton moved for a rehearing, both Caperton and Mas-
sey filed recusal motions to have three of the five justices removed
(2006) (requiring political organizations to meet certain requirements in order to be tax
exempt). Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
10. Id. The $500,000 was used for direct mailings, letters soliciting donations, and
advertisements on television and in the newspapers. Id.
11. Id. The $3 million Blankenship contributed were more than "the total amount
spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin's
own committee." Id.
12. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. Benjamin received 382,036 votes (53.30%) and
McGraw received 334,301 votes (46.7%). Id.
13. Id. The theory upon which Caperton based his motion was that if Justice Benjamin
would hear the case it would violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. The Due Process Clause states
that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIIV, § 1.
14. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. According to Benjamin, he "carefully considered the
bases and accompanying exhibits proffered by the movants." Id. at 2258 (quoting Joint
Appendix at 336a-337a, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08.22)). He found "no objective
information . .. to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant, that this
Justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be
anything but fair and impartial." Id. at 2258 (quoting Joint Appendix, supra, at 336a-
337a).
15. Id. at 2258.
16. Id. The $50 million verdict was reversed in November of 2007. Id. The majority
based their decision on a forum selection clause found in a contract where Massey was not
a party, and claimed that the suit was barred by res judicata because of another judgment,
not in West Virginia, where Massey was also not a party. Id.
17. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. Justice Starcher claimed that "the majority's opinion
is morally and legally wrong," and Justice Albright claimed the majority "misappl[ied] the
law and introduced sweeping new law into our jurisprudence that may well come back to
haunt us." Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 420a.422a).
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from the rehearing. 18 Justice Benjamin denied the recusal motion,
but the two other justices recused themselves.19 After granting
the rehearing, Justice Benjamin, acting as Chief Justice, replaced
Justices Maynard and Starcher with Judges Cookman and Fox.
20
In a three-to-two decision in April 2008, the court again reversed
the lower court's $50 million judgment.21
In August 2008, Caperton filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States based on a violation of the
Due Process Clause.22 Justice Benjamin, who had joined in the
majority opinion, filed a separate concurring opinion after the pe-
tition for writ of certiorari was filed.2 3 In the concurrence, Justice
Benjamin cited the law under which a judge is required to recuse
himself so as to not violate due process, and why he thought there
was no need for him to do so in this case.24
11. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN CAPER TON
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
settle the due process issue of when an elected judge, who received
sizeable campaign contributions from a party, should recuse him-
self from hearing that party's case.25 In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Kennedy recognized that in most instances the Constitution
does not mandate recusal, and that it generally falls upon the leg-
18. Id. Recusal is the "removal of oneself as judge or policy-maker in a particular mat-
ter, esp. because of a conflict of interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (9th ed. 2009).
19. Id. The three justices were Justice Maynard, who granted the motion, Justice
Starcher, who granted the motion, and Justice Benjamin, who denied the motion despite
being urged to grant it by Justice Starcher. Id. Photographs had been released showing
Justice Maynard vacationing with Blankenship in the French Riviera. Id. In Justice
Starcher's recusal memorandum he stated that "Blankenship's bestowal of his personal
wealth, political tactics, and 'friendship' have created a cancer in the affairs of this court."
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 459a-460a.
20. Id.
21. Id. Justice Benjamin, Justice Davis and Judge Fox voted to overturn the verdict
and Justice Albright and Judge cookman dissented. Id.
22. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
23. Id.
24. Id. Justice Benjamin stated that he did not have any "direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest" in the case. Id. (quoting Transcript of Record at 677a, Cazperton, 679
S.E.2d at 223 (No. 33350)). He did not want to "adopt a standard merely of appearances"
which "seems little more than an invitation to subject West Virginia's justice system to the
vagaries of the day-a framework in which predictability and stability yield to supposition,
innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations." Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra
note 14, at 692a,).
25. Id. at 2256.
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islature to establish the grounds for recusal.26 Justice Kennedy,
however, did acknowledge that in certain limited instances the
common-law mandated recusal; he further observed that U.S.
courts incorporated those common-law principles, as well as other
non-common-law principles, in the Due Process Clause.27
Justice Kennedy then outlined the Supreme Court's history of
when it has required recusal.28 He noted that the Court has re-
quired recusal in two situations. 29 The first situation incorporated
the common-law rule and occurred when the judge had a financial
stake in the outcome of the case. 30 Based on those cases, the
Court held that due process requires disqualification of a judge
when monetary interests in the outcome may entice him to favor
one side in the dispute.31 The second situation, which extended
beyond the common-law principle, required recusal when a judge
had participated in a prior proceeding related to the case.3 2 One
instance involved a judge who acted as the grand jury and then
proceeded to serve as the trial judge.33 Another situation involved
a judge who convicted a defendant of criminal contempt where the
judge himself was the basis for the charge. 34 Justice Kennedy
noted that in these situations the Court did not consider whether
the judge had actual bias, but rather whether the circumstances
created a strong possibility for bias by the judge.35
26. Id. at 2259. Justice Kennedy stated that "most matters relating to judicial disquali-
fication [do] not rise to a constitutional level." Id. (citing FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S.
683, 702 (1948)). Justice Kennedy was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id at 2256. Chief Justice Roberts dissented and was joined
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Id. Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting opi-
nion. Id.
27. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2259-60. Justice Kennedy cited Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), "[tjhe
early and leading case on the subject." Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259. In it, the Court found
that due process requires a judge to recuse himself when he has "a direct, personal, sub-
stantial, pecuniary interest" in the case. Id.
31. Id. at 2260.61. 'The proper constitutional inquiry is 'whether sitting on the case..
would offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to .. . lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true." Id. at 2261. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813, 825 (1986)).
32. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261.
33. Id. (discussing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)).
34. Id. at 2262 (discussing Mayberry v. Peninsylvaniia, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)).
35. Id. 'The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but
whether the average judge in his position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an
unconstitutional 'potential for bias."' Id.
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After detailing the history of due process and recusal, Justice
Kennedy returned to the issue in this case. 36 Justice Kennedy
noted that the Court had never reviewed a case involving bias
within the context of judicial elections. 37 On this point he ac-
knowledged that Caperton argued that the prior due process cas-
es, which required judicial recusal, presented analogous situations
to this one because Justice Benjamin would feel indebted to rule in
Blankenship's favor.38
The majority stated that the Due Process Clause should not re-
quire disqualification based on subjective observations. 39 Rather,
the Court established the proper inquiry as whether the circums-
tances objectively showed a high propensity to favor one side.40
Based on this objective standard, the Court concluded that an un-
constitutional risk of bias existed when a party exercised substan-
tial influence over what judge heard their case.41 In the context of
judicial elections, the majority opined, substantial influence is not
determined by the amount the individual donates, but rather how
much that amount compares to the total spent throughout the
campaign, and whether that contribution may have influenced the
results.42
Applying those objective standards to this case, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the circumstances surrounding Justice Benjamin's
election would result in the questioning of his impartiality, even if
the Court could not determine whether Blankenship's actions led
to Justice Benjamin's election. 43 Indeed, Justice Kennedy stated
that determining why one candidate wins an election is nearly as
impossible as determining someone's personal thoughts, and this
difficulty makes an objective standard more workable than a sub-
jective one in the context of judicial elections. 44
36. Id.
37. Caiperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2263.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2263-64.
42. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264. Justice Kennedy wrote that the question centered on
the size of the contribution in comparison to the "total amount of money contributed to the
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution
had on the outcome of the election." Id.
43. Id. at 2264. Blankenship contributed three million dollars in favor of Justice Ben-
jamin, exceeding by three hundred percent the amount spent by Benjamin's own campaign
committee. Id. Caperton argued that Blankenship spent one million dollars more than the
combined total of Benjamin's opposition. Id.
44. Id. The majority noted the defenses that both Massey and Justice Benjamin raised
about why Benjamin won the election, but did not find them persuasive in deciding this
934 Vol. 48
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The majority held that although the previous judicial disqualifi-
cation cases failed to provide similar facts, the rules used in those
cases could still be applied here. 45 Justice Kennedy reasoned that,
given all the circumstances, Blankenship's support sufficiently
jeopardized the impartiality of Justice Benjamin, and due process
required his disqualification. 46  The majority also questioned
Blankenship's motives for the expenditures during the judicial
election without implying that there was a quid pro quo type of
agreement between Benjamin and Blankenship. 47 The majority
concluded that a substantial risk of bias existed in this case.4 8
Therefore, it determined that the Due Process Clause required
recusal in this case, despite the failure of Justice Benjamin to find
any bias.49
Prior to concluding, the majority addressed the consequences of
requiring disqualification of a judge under the Due Process Clause
without some definitive proof of partiality.50 Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that although the situation at issue was distinguishable
from any prior case, those earlier cases still provided some insight
into the Court's decision in this case. 51 Because the issue tested
the outermost bounds of the Constitution, the Court needed to de-
velop a new way to review these cases using independent stan-
dards.52 By using the prior disqualification cases as a guide, the
Court adopted an objective standard to settle these rare in-
stances.53
The majority did not foresee any rippling effects from adopting
their objective standard, especially since the majority of states
already have measures in place to abolish the slightest amount of
partiality.54 Justice Kennedy noted that states may choose to
case. Id. Massey claimed that Blankenship's support did not cause Benjamin's victory; he
was elected by a majority of West Virginia voters, he was supported by all the major news-
papers but one, and a poor speech by Justice McGraw cost him the election. Id. Justice
Benjamin claimed his campaign themes as well as Justice McGraw's shortcomings were the
reason for his victory. Id.
45. Id. See Thmney, 273 U.S. at 532; Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
46. Caperton, 129 S. ct. at 2264.
47. Id. at 2265.
48. Id.
49. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that Justice Benjamin "did undertake an extensive
search for actual bias." Id.
50. Id.
51. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265. See Thmey, 273 U.S. at 532; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47
(1975).
52. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
53. Id. "[Tihe Court dealt with extreme facts that created an unconstitutional probabil-
ity of bias that 'cannot be defined with precision."' Id. (quoting Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813).
54. Id. at 2265.
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adopt stricter standards than those needed to meet due process. 55
The majority reasoned that because of these state standards,
along with the extreme circumstances addressed by the cases rely-
ing on the Due Process Clause, only a few disputes will actually
require turning to the Constitution.56
Based on the majority's reasoning, the Court determined that
Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself violated Caperton's
due process rights.57 The Court, therefore, reversed the decision of
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and sent the case
back to the lower court.58
B. Chief Justice Roberts'Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts dissented. Although he agreed with the
majority regarding the importance of unbiased and impartial
judges, he explained that the majority expanded a judicial doc-
trine further than the law has ever required, and such policy deci-
sions should be left to the lawmakers, not the courts. 59 The Chief
Justice argued that the majority created an unworkable rule that
would only lead to more litigation and a decrease in the public's
faith in the judiciary. 60
The Chief Justice believed that it was well settled as to when
due process required recusal. 6' His dissent argued that there
could be some semblance of partiality in almost every case, includ-
ing those where a friendly relationship exists or even where the
judge and a party share the same religion.6.2 Out of those cases,
though, the Chief Justice opined that very few actually present
due process violations, especially because judges are generally
recognized as fair adjudicators. 63 Chief Justice Roberts then listed
forty problematic questions that he believed courts would need to
55. Id. at 2267. States can "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires." Id. (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)).
56. Id.
57. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
58. Id.
59. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Joining Chief Justice Ro-
berts in the dissent were Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas and Justice Alito. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Chief Justice Roberts noted that the federal Due Process Clause has only re-
quired recusal when "the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case, and
when the judge is trying a defendant for certain criminal contempts." Id.
62. Id. at 2268. Chief Justice Roberts list the factors as: "friendship with a party or
lawyer, prior employment experience, membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches
and writings, religious affiliation, and countless other considerations." Id.
63. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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answer based on the majority's holding. 64 The Chief Justice noted
that the majority did not create a standard to which lower courts
could look for answers, and that an unclear standard such as this
one may account for why the Court had never mandated recusal
using such terms in the past.65
Chief Justice Roberts further noted that despite this issue test-
ing the outermost realm of recusal, the law should not change
simply to fit the situation.66 As with unclear standards in the
past, the dissent argued that the majority decision created more
problems, 67 and the Court would have to continually revisit this
decision.68
The Chief Justice concluded by analyzing the contributions
made by Blankenship in this case, believing that the Court could
not conclusively infer any unusual circumstances given the facts
surrounding this case. 69 Justice Benjamin exercised no control
over a vast majority of Blankenship's spending, the dissent noted,
and Blankenship had donated large sums of money toward politi-
cal campaigns in the past.70 Also, many other explanations ex-
isted for Justice Benjamin's victory, including faults by his oppo-
nent.71
64. Id. at 2269-72. Some of the questions were: "How much money is too much mon-
ey?" Id. at 269. "Does what is unconstitutional vary from state to state?" Id. at 270.
"What is the proper remedy?" Id. at 271.
65. Id. at 2272. The Chief Justice noted that "probability" or "appearance" of bias has
never been used in the common law or by the Court to require judicial disqualification. Id.
66. Id. Chief Justice Roberts stated that "[h]ard cases make bad law." Id.
67. Id. at 2274. "It is an old clich6, but sometimes the cure is worse than the disease."
Id.
68. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts
cited the example of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) and the subsequent case
of Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). In Halper the court held that a civil penalty could violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause in extreme cases, and eight years later in Hudson the Court addressed the
problems created by Halper. Id. "It is an old clichd, but sometimes the cure is worse than
the disease." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2273-74.
71. Id. at 2274. Justice Benjamin defeated his opponent by a seven-point margin, there
was a speech made by Benjamin's opponent that was described as "deeply disturbing," his
opponent did not give interviews or do debates, and only one newspaper did not support
Benjamin. Id. "Justice Benjamin just might have won because the voters of West Virginia
thought be would be a better judge than his opponent." Id.
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C. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia authored his own dissent to explain his discom-
fort with the rule the majority created. 72 Justice Scalia agreed
with Chief Justice Roberts's dissent, but he further explained that
the Due Process Clause cannot be used to solve every claim, which
is what he believed the majority was trying to do in this case. 73
Justice Scalia concluded by stating that the Court should not have
heard this claim in the first place. 74
111. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION AND PRECEDENT LEADING TO CAPERTON
A. The Common Law
The requirement of judicial disqualification is an old and simple
principle deeply rooted in the common law. 75 Originating with the
common law maxim that "no man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause," the rule was not flexible, and it pertained to the king
as well as a judge at any level. 76 This maxim required courts to
set aside decisions when a judge had any interest, or even an ap-
pearance of an interest, in the case. 77 This maxim was clarified as
early as 1610, in what is commonly called Dr. Bonham's Case.78 In
that case, Sir Edward Coke found the Royal College of Physicians,
who participated as judges and parties in the same cases while
receiving half of all the fines they issued, ineligible to decide the
issue.79 In 1613, Coke further expanded this doctrine when he
held that the mayor of Hereford should not have adjudicated a
72. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2272. Justice Scalia stated: "Divinely inspired text may contain the answers
to all earthly questions, hut the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not. The Court
today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through
the Constitution." id.
74. Id. Justice Scalia hinted that some issues cannot be solved by the Court and that
"is why [they are] called nonjusticiable." Id.
75. GEORGE F. WHARTON, LEGAL MAXIMS, WITH OBSERVATIONS AND CASES 101.02 (3d
ed. 1903).
76. Id. "Nemo debet ease judex in proprii causd." Id.
77. Id. at 101.
78. Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham 's Case and Judicial Review, HARV. L. REV. 30,
34 (1926) (discussing the holding in Dr. Bonham's Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.).
79. Id. Thomas Bonham, a Doctor of Medicine of the University of Cambridge, was
called before the President and Censors of the Royal College of Physicians who found Dr.
Bonham deficient to practice medicine~ and fined him ne~ hundred shillings. id. at 32.
Bonham continued to practice and the Royal College continued to sanction him. Id. Bon-
ham was eventually imprisoned by order of the Royal College, and he challenged the au-
thority of the college. Id.
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case in which he had rented property to the plaintiff and the
plaintiff sued to gain rights to that same piece of property.80 Coke
stated that "[wihen a judge has an interest, neither he nor his
deputy can determine a cause; and if he does, a prohibition lies."81
A later case in 1742 went as far as extending this maxim to hold
that a justice of the peace could not remove a destitute man from
his own community because of the justice's status as an interested
party. 82 At common law, however, personal bias or prejudices
alone were not reasons for judicial disqualification. 8 3
B. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
1. A Pecuniary Interest in the Outcome of the Case
The Caperton court, in reaching its decision, relied heavily on
the Court's prior decisions involving two distinct situations where
the Due Process Clause had required disqualification. 8 4 The first
situation involved cases where a judge had a pecuniary interest in
deciding a particular case a certain way.85 In 1927, in Tumey v.
Ohio, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the issue
of whether a mayor, who acted as judge in a case in which he had
a financial incentive to find the accused guilty, violated due
process. 86 In the case, an Ohio statute provided that a mayor may
act as the judge in cases involving violations of the law which for-
bid the possession of alcohol.87 The village of North College Hill
passed an ordinance pursuant to that statute, which provided that
upon a conviction the mayor would receive a portion of the fees
assessed as payment for his service, with the remainder distri-
buted to help enforce the law.818 However, if the mayor did not
80. Earl of Derby's Case, (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1390 (K.B.). Sir John Egerton brought an
action against Willaim Earl of Derby, Chamberlain of Chester, and others, for the "trust
and interest of a farm called Budshaw," where Chamberlain of Chester was the only Judge
in Equity who heard the case. Id.
81. Id.
82. Between the Parishes of Great Charte & Kennington, (1742) 93 Eng. Rep. 1107
(K.B.)
83. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259. Historically, the legislatures determined the grounds
for disqualification of a judge in the United States. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Thmey, 273 U.S. at 514.
87. Id. at 517.
88. Id. at 517.19.
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convict a defendant and the court did not asses any fees, then the
mayor/judge received no payment for his service. 89
The Thmey Court noted that most issues regarding disqualifica-
tion of a judge do not implicate the Constitution, and "matters of
kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest"
are issues better left to the legislature.90 The Court did find, how-
ever, that a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause violation
would occur when and if the judge had a "direct, personal, sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against [the
accused]." 9' In addressing older cases and legislation, the Court
noticed that throughout history judges have often received pay-
ment through fines and fees, but never contingent on a finding of
guilt.9
2
The Court in Tumey held that a procedure which presents an
opportunity for a reasonable judge to not "hold the balance nice,
clear, and true" denies a litigant the due process of law.9 3 In this
case, the mayor/judge had a financial responsibility not only to
himself but also to the city. 94 With the judge's financial interests
in mind, the accused could have concluded that he may not receive
a fair trial.95 Therefore, the judge should have disqualified him-
self before considering any of the evidence against the accused,
and his failure to do so violated the due process rights of the ac-
cused.96
89. Id at 520.
90. Id. at 522.
91. Thmey, 273 U.S. at 522. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United State Constitu-
tion asserts that "[No State shall .. , deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. cONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. Id. at 524-26. The court traced the history from the common law of England before
the colonies broke away from the mainland. Id. at 524. "As early as 12 Richard I1, A. D.
1388, it was provided that there should be a commission of the justices of the peace..
should receive four shillings a day ... out of a fund made up of fines ... Id.
93. Id. at 532. The rule was stated as:
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the
argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it
on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible tempta-
tion to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict
the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true
between the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law.
Id.
94. Id. From May 11, 1923 to December 31, 1923 the fines collected totaled more than
$20,000, of which the village received $4,471.25 for general use, the state received
$8,992.50, $2,697.25 went into a village safety fund, and the remainder went into the en-
forcement fund of which the mayor received $696.35. Id. at 52 1.
95. Id. at 533.
96. Thmey, 273 U.S. at 535. The last argument made by the State was that the evi-
dence showed the defendant was "clearly guilty" and was only fined the minimum of $100.
Id.
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Almost fifty years after Thmey, the Court addressed this same
matter in Ward v. Village of Monroeville.97 Ward had similar facts
to those in Thmey, except that the mayor/judge's wage in Ward did
not depend upon a finding of guilt and a procedural safeguard ex-
isted so that a defendant could easily appeal.98 A substantial
amount of the village's income, however, came from the fees and
fines.99 The Court, looking to the holding from Thmey, found that
receiving a salary based on convictions was not determinative of
that case.' 00 Rather, the outcome resulted from the facts present-
ing a situation in which a reasonable person "[could] not hold the
balance nice, clear, and true." 01
In Ward, the Court determined that the Ohio mayor had a con-
cern in the financial interests of the village, especially due to the
rather substantial amount attributed to the fines.102 Therefore,
the law violated the due process rights of the accused because the
mayor/judge might rule against him based on his financial inter-
est in the case.103 Finally, the Court concluded that the appeal
procedure did not sufficiently protect a person's due process
rights.104 The due process violation occurred as a result of the in-
centive to convict during trial; therefore, it did not matter that an
appeal could fix the bias after trial. 105
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court expanded upon this prin-
ciple to non-trial events when it addressed the issue concerning
whether a due process violation occurred when a justice of the
peace received payment for issuing a search warrant. 106 In Con-
nally v. Georgia, the justice received a minimal amount, five dol-
lars, for issuing a warrant, but he did not receive any compensa-
tion if he denied the warrant' 07 The Court found that this proce-
97. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
98. Ward, 409 U.S. at 60-61.
99. Id. at 59. In 1964, the village had a total revenue of $46,355.38, of which,
$23,589.50 came from income produced by fees and fines imposed by the mayor. Id. at 58.
In 1968, of the $52,995.95 total revenue, $23,439.42 came from the fees and fines. Id.
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id. (citing Thmey, 273 U.S. at 532).
102. Id.
103. Ward, 409 U.S. at 60.
104. Id. at 61. The village argued that any bias could be fixed because the law allowed
an appeal and trial de novo in the "County Court of Common Pleas." Id. Trial de novo is
defined as "[a) new trial on the entire case - that is, on both questions of fact and issues of
law--conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1654 (9th ed. 2009).
105. Id.
106. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
107. Connally, 429 U.S. at 246.
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dure violated due process, despite the nominal amount of money
involved, because the justice received a financial award for taking
some action, but received nothing for inaction."108
The Supreme Court further articulated when a pecuniary inter-
est required recusal in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.109
There, the Court dealt with the issue of whether a member of the
Alabama Supreme Court, Justice Embry, violated a party's due
process rights by not recusing himself from hearing a claim that
was nearly identical to two claims that he was a party to in a low-
er court.110 Bad faith payment by an insurance company was the
basis of the claim.1"' The issue that ultimately determined the
outcome of the case was whether partial payment would dismiss
the entire claim. 12 If the insurance company lost the case, then
the Justice's claim in the lower court would likely succeed. 113
In a five-to-four decision, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
a jury award for $3.5 million against the insurance company, with
Justice Embry joining the majority.114 The insurance company
moved for the justices of the court to recuse themselves because
they were all potential members of Justice Embry's suit, and to
allow a rehearing because of Justice Embry's involvement.115 The
justices denied the motions."16 After the insurance company ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Embry settled
his personal claims for $30,000.117
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court did not find that
the Justice's hostility towards insurance companies required dis-
qualification."18 The Court, again relying on Thmey, held that sit-
uations where the judge has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecu-
niary interest" in the outcome of the case violate the. Fourteenth
108. Id. at 250.
109. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1985).
110. Lavoije, 475 U.S. at 815. The Justice had filed two "bad-faith failure to pay" claims
in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama. Id. at 817.
111. Id. at 816-17.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 822.
114. Id. at 816.
115. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 817.
116. Id. at 817-18.
117. Id. Justice Embry settled with Blue Cross for $30,000 but his claim against another
insurance company, Maryland Casualty Company, was settled earlier by paying his claim.
Id. at 819.
118. Id. at 820. According to a transcript from Justice Embry's deposition, he indicated
frustration with insurance companies, and when asked a question regarding if he has ever
had trouble making insurance claims, he responded with "[t]hat is a silly question. For
years and years." Id. at 818.
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Amendment Due Process Clause. 119 The Court found that the Jus-
tice did have such an interest in the outcome of this case. 120 The
Justice not only heard the case, but decided it in such a way that
benefited his personal claims. 12' Therefore, the Court concluded
that the insurance company's due process rights had been vi-
olated.122 The Court did not base its ruling on a finding of actual
bias, but because the situation "would offer a possible temptation
to the average . .. judge to. ... lead him to not to hold the balance
nice, clear, and true."123 The Court articulated that it is the "ap-
pearance of justice" that is required to satisfy a party's due
process rights. 124
2. Personal Involvement in a Prior Proceeding
In Caperton, the Court also relied on instances where a judge
had been involved in the prior proceeding and became personally
implicated in the matter. 25 This rule in the United States, with-
out specifically relying on due process, dates back to the 1925 de-
cision of Cooke v. United States.126 At issue in the case was if a
personal letter, asking for the judge's removal, written to the
judge after the verdict had been entered, was contemptuous. 1
2 7
After the Court addressed the contempt issue, it remarked that
when possible, a judge who suffers a personal attack, which leads
to a charge of contempt, should ask another judge to take his place
and preside over the contempt charge. 28 The judge's emotional
involvement, which would not allow for the partiality and compo-
sure necessary in decision- making, necessitated his replace-
ment. 1 29
The Supreme Court, in 1955, determined whether a judge acting
as a single-person grand jury, who then charged and convicted the
119. Id. at 824 (quoting Thmney, 273 U.S. at 523).
120. Lavoije, 475 U.S. at 824.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 825 (quoting Tumney, 273 U.S. at 532).
124. Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136). See supra notes 119-124; infra notes
126-29.
125. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261. Contempt is defined as "[clonduct that defies the
authority or dignity of a court or legislature. Because such conduct interferes with the
administration of justice, it is punishable, usu[ally] by fine or imprisonment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 360 (9th ed. 2009).
126. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
127. Cooke, 267 U.S. at 532.
128. Id. at 539.
129. Id.
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man for contempt at trial, violated that person's due process
rights, in In re Murchison. 130 In Murchison, Michigan law allowed
a judge to act as a single-person grand jury.131 Murchison and
White testified before a one-judge grand jury and had to answer
questions related to gambling and bribery. 132 The judge did not
find Murchison's answers truthful, and White refused to answer
without a lawyer present. 33 The judge subsequently charged
them both with contempt and required them to appear in court to
defend against the charges. 134 The judge tried the men in open
court, and he found them guilty of contempt. 135
In Murchison, the Court held that a "[a] fair trial in a fair tri-
bunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases." 36 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that the judge in this case essentially acted
as a grand jury and performed an investigation into the matter,
and then he tried the person as a result of his own investiga-
tion. 37 Justice Black held that a judge could not remove himself
from what he discovered during a grand jury proceeding. 38
Therefore, Justice Black concluded that when the same judge who
charged a man with contempt, proceeded to try him for that
charge, violated due process. 39 Again, the Court focused on "the
appearance of justice," rather than actual bias. 40
In 1971, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,'14 ' the Supreme Court had
to determine whether a judge holding a man in contempt of court
and then proceeding to sentence the man for that charge violated
due process. 42 During the trial for a prison breach and holding
hostages, Mayberry, who represented himself, repeatedly insulted
the judge and the court.'143 Prior to the sentencing for the criminal
130. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
131. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.3-4 (1948). Michigan law
also forbade any judge who conducted one of these grand-juries from trying any case or
related filing that may arise from the inquiry. Id. at 135.
132. Id. at 134. Murchison was a Detroit policeman. Id.
133. Id. at 135.
134. Id. at 134.35.
135. Id. at 135.
136. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
137. Id. at 137.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 136 (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
141. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
142. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 455.
143. Id. at 456-62. Mayberry and two other co-defendants were charged with the same
crimes. Id. at 455. They all choose to represent themselves despite being appointed coun-
sel. Id. The most offensive of the insults aimed at the judge included "dirty sonofabitch,"
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charges, the judge found Mayberry guilty of criminal contempt
and then sentenced him for that charge. 144
The Supreme Court concluded that a judge should neither ac-
knowledge a parties' attack, nor even reply to it, because any re-
sponse by the judge would not satisfy the "appearance of jus-
tice."14 5 Here, the judge had suffered very personal attacks and
would not likely have been able to remain separated from the case
in a way to properly administer justice.14 6 The Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires a different judge, other than the
judge who accused a person of contempt, to find guilt.' 47
In Taylor v. Hayes,'48 the Supreme Court further determined
that a different judge, rather than the judge who charged the man,
should preside at the rehearing for petty criminal contempt
charges. 149 There, the Court decided whether a person charged
with contempt of court should be given a jury trial, and whether
the defendant's due process rights had been violated by not being
given an opportunity to be heard. 150 Justice White found that a
jury trial was not required, but the defendant's due process rights
had been violated by not being afforded an opportunity to respond
to the contempt charges. 51 Justice White further held that if the
court gave the man a new trial, the retrial should not be heard by
the same judge because it is unlikely that the judge could main-
tain a "calm detachment." 5 2
3. The "Appearance" of Bias
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of "appearance" of bias
in Aiken County v. BSP Div. of Envirotech Corp.'153 Here, the court
determined if two ex parte contacts, concerning scheduling of a
meeting and a memorandum request to the judge, which occurred
"dirty tyrannical old dog," and "fool." Id. at 466. Other insults included "stumbling dog,"
the judge was accused of running a "Spanish Inquisition," and was told "to go to hell," and
to "[kleep [his] mouth shut." Id.
144. Id. at 463. The court stated the contempt charge as follows: "On December 9, 1966,
you have constantly, boisterously, and insolently interrupted the Court during its attempts
to charge the jury, thereby creating an atmosphere of utter confusion and chaos." Id. at
462.
145. Id. at 465 (quoting Oftt, 348 U.S. at 14.)
146. Id.
147. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 466.
148. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
149. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 488.
150. Id. at 495.
151. Id. at 499.
152. Id. at 501.
153. 866 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1989).
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without notice to the other party, violated due process.154 The
Court held that due process protects against even an "appearance
of bias," but the communications at issue here did not rise to an
unconstitutional level. 155
To the contrary, the Third Circuit has held that "bad appear-
ances" alone do not require disqualification. 1 56 In Johnson v. Car-
roll, 5 7 a judge spoke with an ex-prosecutor at a social event in
which the ex-prosecutor told the judge of certain prior bad acts of
a man who the judge was to sentence.158 Subsequently, the judge
sentenced the man and claimed he was not biased because of the
statements communicated to him at the party. 59 The Third Cir-
cuit held that due process had not been violated even if the court
assumed that there was an appearance of bias. 160
The Fifth Circuit has also held that judicial disqualification, as
mandated by due process, did not extend to a mere "appearance"~
of bias in Richardson v. Quaterman.61 Here, the defendant was
charged with the murder of his wife, who was an acquaintance of
the judge's wife.162 The Circuit Court held that, because the case
was not similar to any prior United States Supreme Court case,
"appearance of bias" in this situation did not require recusal. 16 3
4. Campaign Contributions
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in 2001, addressed the issue
of whether a trial judge should be disqualified from hearing a di-
vorce proceeding because the judge accepted campaign contribu-
tions from the husband while the case pended trial.164 In Pierce v.
Pierce,165 while the divorce case awaited trial, the husband and his
father each donated five thousand dollars to the judge's political
154. Aiken, 866 F.2d at 677-78.
155. Id.
156. Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2004).
157. Johnson, 369 F.3d at 253.
158. Id. at 254.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 259.
161. 537 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2008).
162. Richardson, 537 F.3d at 468. The victim and the judge's wife both belonged to the
Junior League of Dallas, a women's volunteer organization. Id. at 468-69.
163. Id. at 476. The Circuit Court recognized only three situations where due process
required recusal: 1) when the judge has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case; 2)
when the judge has been a target of personal abuse or criticism; 3) and when the judge also
acts as investigator. Id. at 475.
164. Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 793 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
165. Pierce, 39 P.3d at 791.
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campaign. 166 The husband allegedly informed his wife that she
would not win in the custody dispute for her minor child, to which
she then requested the judge's recusal.167 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that due process includes "the right to a trial
without the appearance of judge partiality arising from counsel's
campaign contributions and solicitation of campaign contributions
on behalf of a judge during a case pending before the judge."
168
IV. HOW THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY CLARIFIED THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE AND CREATED A "PROBABILITY OF BIAS"
STANDARD
At common law, only when a judge had a monetary interest in
the outcome of the case did it require judicial disqualification. 
16 9
Over time, courts held that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution incorporated
this same principle, 170 and also courts have extended due process
to those situations where a judge may be biased by what had oc-
curred in a prior court proceeding. 171 The Supreme Court in Ca-
perton has once again clarified due process and required disquali-
fication based on an objective probability of bias where a party to a
case donated a substantial amount of money to a judge's political
campaign. 72 The Court looked to those past situations in which
due process had required judicial disqualification and correctly
determined that there should be an overall "probability of actual
bias"173 standard.
A. Actual Bias" was Never the Test
Massey had argued that an appearance, or probability, of im-
propriety could never rise to an unconstitutional level; rather,
there needs to be evidence of actual bias. 174 However, in prior case
law, the Court had at least hinted at, if not actually used, a test
based on probability and appearance of impropriety. Perhaps the
most prominent case demonstrating this principle was Lavoie, in
166. Id. at 793.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 799.
169. See supra notes 7 5-83.
170. See supra notes 86-96.
171. See supra notes 127-131.
172. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2252.
173. Id. at 2257.
174. Brief for Respondents at 15, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).
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which the Court held that due process required recusal when the
"6situation was one which would offer a possible temptation to the
average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true."17 5 This same "temptation" was present in Murchi-
son where the judge criminally charged a man with contempt, and
then proceeded to be the judge over that charge. 76 In both of
those instances, the Court did not rely on a finding of actual bias.
The Court relied on an appearance of bias, even if it may have la-
beled it differently. The majority, therefore, properly held that
because the standard needed to be based on objective observa-
tions, a probability test was appropriate. Using that objective
test, the Court correctly found that the support given to Justice
Benjamin's campaign, because of its extreme nature, required his
disqualification. The "possible temptation," that was present in
Lavoie and Murchison, was also present in Caperton.
Basing violations of due process rights solely on an actual find-
ing of bias would have been detrimental to the fundamental right
of a fair trial. The Court has continually held that "a fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."177 If the stan-
dard was not based on objective determinations, how could a liti-
gant determine if a judge was "actually biased"? What evidence
could a party use to make this determination? Throughout histo-
ry, disqualification only required a slight showing of some pecu-
niary interest.178 Financial impact on the judge in those cases was
the only way to prove an actual bias, other than an admittance of
bias by the judge. In Caperton, Justice Benjamin searched within
for bias, but found none.' 79 Without questioning the Justice's ho-
nesty, clearly there is no way to know for sure how he reached his
decision. "[T]here may be no adequate protection against a judge
who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work
in deciding a case" without an objective test.18 0
B. The Future of Judicial Disqualification
A final argument against using a "probability" standard was
how it would affect the future of judicial disqualification.'18 ' The
175. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 822.
176. Murchison, 349 U.S. 133.
177. Id. at 136.
178. See supra note 76.
179. Caperton, 129 U.S. at 2263.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2266.
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prior disqualification cases, as pointed out by the majority in Ca-
perton, did not beget a rush of recusal motions.182 The majority
correctly reasoned that because of the extreme facts and unusual
circumstances, there would be few questions as to when this new
standard would apply, and how lower courts should apply it. After
all, in the past the "courts proved quite capable of applying the
standards to less extreme situations."18 3
V. HOW THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN NOT SUFFICIENTLY
CLARIFYING ITs HOLDING
Despite the Court reaching the correct holding, the Court should
have clarified it sufficiently to allow future determinations as to
when it should apply. In Caperton, the Court determined that the
"probability of bias" standard should be used in the context of con-
tributions to judicial campaigns. Without making clear that it
should only apply to these situations, the Court has left open nu-
merous circumstances which may need further clarification at a
later time. This standard may apply to situations where the judge
has any pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, despite the
common law rule that has been effective in the past. In these sit-
uations, the courts should still require disqualification in any cir-
cumstance where the judge may have the slightest pecuniary in-
terest. Situations involving "friendship with a party or lawyer,
prior employment experience," as well as numerous others may
also proffer an appearance of bias 18 14 A probability of bias stan-
dard may require judicial disqualification under some, if not all, of
those circumstances, based merely on appearances. The holding
in Caperton, therefore, should be narrowly applied only to cam-
paign contribution cases.
If the courts believe that this standard should apply to any judi-
cial situation then there could be countless unwanted effects. Im-
agine the United States legal system without Marbury v. Madi-
son.185 There, Justice John Marshall was the United States Secre-
tary of State prior to becoming a justice on the Supreme Court. 
186
It was John Marshall's failure to deliver several federal judicial
appointments, under his capacity of Secretary, which lead to the
182. Id.
183. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266.
184. Id. at 2268. (Roberts, CAJ., dissenting).
185. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
186. Brief for Respondents, supra note 171, at 26.
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suit being brought to the Supreme Court. 187 Under the probability
of bias standard, due process would most likely have required
John Marshall's recusal, which would have substantially changed
the entire judicial system and judicial review.
VI. THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Prior to Caperton, the Supreme Court had never held that judi-
cial campaign contributions ever violated due process, and typical-
ly left those matters to the legislatures. The legislature of West
Virginia enacted legislation to address appearances of judicial bi-
as. West Virginia enacted a Code of Judicial Conduct similar to
that of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Code.
188
West Virginia's code, Canon 2A provided that "[a] Judge shall..
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge's activities." 1 8 9 Furthermore, Canon 3E provided that a
judge "disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."190 The en-
forcement of this code is provided through the Judicial Investiga-
tion Commission,191 and matters are investigated upon the is-
suance of a complaint. 192 If found that a judge acted in violation of
the code, the Commission is allowed to enter any of the following
sanctions: admonishment, reprimand, censure, suspension with-
out pay for up to one year, a fine of up to $5,000, or involuntary
retirement. 93 Almost every state adopted a similar code for judi-
cial conduct based on the ABA model.'194
187. Id.
188. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct in Canon 2, Rule 2.11(A) states:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following
circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias of prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a par-
ty's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous [insert
number] year[s] made aggregate contributions to the judge's campaign in an
amount that [is greater than $[insert amount) for an individual or $Iinsert
amount] for an entity] [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an
entity].
MODEL CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 2 (2007).
189.W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (1993).
190. W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E (1993).
191. W. VA. R. OFJUD. DISC. PROC. 1 (1994).
192. W. VA. R. OFJUD. Disc. PROC. 2 (1994).
193. W. A. R. OFJUD. Disc. PROC. 4.12 (1994).
194. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266.
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Despite this code of conduct being enacted in West Virginia at
the time, it did not require Justice Benjamin to recuse himself
from the case. This may have been due to the legislature's failure
to keep up with the rapidly changing judicial campaign contribu-
tion trends. The ABA Model Code adapted to these changes in
1999, but West Virginia still operated under the older 1990 ver-
sion.195 As of 2009, only Alabama and Mississippi adopted the
new ABA model and required disqualification when a judge re-
ceived election campaign contributions over a certain amount. 196
Due to the inability of the West Virginia legislature to keep up
with the political trends, and the recent changes to the ABA Model
Code, the Supreme Court properly asserted that it was essential to
determine under which circumstances due process required disqu-
alification, thereby creating a "constitutional floor."197 Without
question, Congress and state legislatures are always free to ex-
tend the protections further, thereby making them more laborious
than the standards mandated by the Court under the Due Process
Clause. 198
VII. CONCLUSION
Considering all of the circumstances, the Court correctly found a
due process violation. This issue, because of the large sum of
money involved, was extreme, and yet the Code of Judicial Con-
duct did not prevent it from occurring. To prevent future occur-
rences there needed to be a constitutional restraint and the proper
vehicle was the Due Process Clause. Although the West Virginia
Code should have prevented such an appearance of bias, there are
times, as here, when statutes fail to correct these instances. It is
only in these situations where the due process analysis should be
used. Most often, the cases that are unconstitutional are atypical,
195. Brief of the American Bar Association at 13, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc,
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).
196. Id. at 14. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The Alabama code requires
recusal of a justice or judge of an appellate court when he receives more than $4,000 to-
wards his campaign, or a circuit judge who receives more than $2,000. ALA. CODE § 12.24-2
(2006). The Mississippi Code does not permit more than $5,000 contributions to political
campaigns in appellate court races, and $2,500 in lower court races. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-
15-1021 (2000).
197. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
198. Id. (quoting Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828).
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and it is in these cases where the Court must develop unbiased
criterion. 199
Aaron F. Ludwig
199. Id. at 2265. "[Elxtreme cases are more likely to cross constitutional limits requiring
the Court's intervention and formulation of objective standards." Id.
